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A B S T R A C T   
I estimate the effect of being the best in the class in primary school on performance in secondary school. I 
implement a novel methodology that exploits that some students are the best in the class because better students 
in the same school are assigned to other classes. If students were randomly assigned, the probability of being the 
best in the class would be a well-known function of students ranking in the school and the number of classes. I use 
this exogenous probability as an instrument for actually being the best in the class. I find a positive impact of being 
the best in the class on future performance: being the best in primary school increases test scores by 0.13 standard 
deviations in secondary school. My instrument is suitable to account for the sorting of units into groups in other 
contexts.   
1. Introduction 
Top-performing students are likely to be tomorrow’s leaders. Jeff 
Bezos, founder and chief executive officer of Amazon.com and richest 
man in the world, graduated valedictorian of his high school and summa 
cum laude from Princeton University. Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft 
and second richest man in the world, was a National Merit Scholar and 
scored 1590 out of 1600 on the SAT (Forbes, 2019). Also according to 
Forbes (2000), most top CEOs excelled in education: 24% of top CEOs in 
Europe have PhD degrees, while the proportion of PhD graduates among 
top CEOs in China is 33%. However, little research is devoted to 
excellent students. In the US, the National Association for Gifted Stu-
dents regrets the absence of a uniform federal policy for “gifted ser-
vices”. This lack of regulation results in a variety of State policies which 
go from “Accommodation in the regular classroom” (where gifted stu-
dents become the best in the class) to “Full-time grouping with students 
of similar abilities” (where, with one exception, excellent students are 
not the best in the class).2 In this paper, I study the consequences of 
being the best student in the class for future academic performance. 
Previous literature shows that, on average, higher positions in the 
school-cohort ranking lead to better future academic performance. 
However, this average effect may not apply to the top performer in the 
class: first, being the best is more salient. Students may know who the 
best student in their class is, but may ignore the identity of the fifth or 
the nineteenth student. Visibility may imply social approval which 
boosts self-confidence and therefore future performance (Ferkany, 
2008). It may also imply more attention and better treatment by 
teachers and peers. However, it may also imply higher expectations 
about students’ future performance which may harm those students 
with low capacity to cope with pressure (Cotton, Dollard, & De Jonge, 
2002). Second, the very best student may be demotivated from lack of 
competition, worsening future performance. Third, the very best stu-
dents do not have better peers who may influence them positively, 
which puts them at a disadvantage in comparison to similar students 
who have better peers.3 However, best in the class students may benefit 
from having worse peers if teachers grade on the curve (Calsamiglia & 
Loviglio, 2019). Finally, best students may be more likely to be bully 
victims, which harms future performance (Brown & Taylor, 2008). 
Actually, Murphy & Weinhardt (2020) estimate school-cohort ranking 
effects in a sample of schools where most schools have only one class per 
cohort and find that the impact of being at the top of the school cohort is 
higher than the average school cohort ranking effect. 
I propose a novel methodology to estimate the impact of being the 
best in the class on future performance that can be applied to contexts 
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where school cohorts have more than one class. I exploit the allocation 
of students to classes within a school. In practice, this allocation may not 
be random. For this reason, I use the theoretical probability of being the 
best in the class under random assignment of students to classes within a 
school as an instrument for being the best in the class. My identification 
strategy relies on two facts: first, a student becomes the best in the class 
only if all better students in the same school-cohort are allocated to other 
classes. Second, if the allocation of students to classes within a school 
was completely random, the probability of being the best in the class 
would be a deterministic function of the student’s position in the school- 
cohort ranking and the number of classes in the school-cohort. For 
example, the second student in a school-cohort with two classes only 
becomes the best in her class if the first student is allocated to another 
class. This occurs with a probability of one half. If the second student in 
the school-cohort attends a school with three classes, this probability 
goes up to two thirds. Finally, the third student in the school-cohort has 
a probability of being the best in the class in a school with two classes 
equal to the probability that both the first and the second student in the 
school-cohort are in the other class (0.52=0.25). My instrument can be 
applied in many situations where sorting to classes may be an issue. 
My objective is to compare the future performance of individuals 
with the same ability where one is the best in the class and the other one 
is not. To make these individuals comparable, I use information on 
students’ performance in a standardized test. I take into account in-
dividuals’ ability by including test score fixed effects and show that my 
results are consistent when I use the highest rank polynomial used by 
previous literature.4 
An additional challenge for the estimation of best in the class effects is 
that the assignment of students to classes may not be random. I account for 
selection into classes as well as peers and teacher characteristics by 
including class fixed effects in my regressions and by instrumenting best in 
the class by the theoretical probability of being best in the class. The latter is 
based on information from the entire school-cohort and is therefore unaf-
fected by selection of students into classes. 
I use data on standardized tests administered to all students in Italy. 
These tests cover two subjects (mathematics and reading), are designed 
by an agency of the Italian Government (the National Institute for the 
Evaluation of the School System - INVALSI), and are mandatory for all 
students. Students are tested in second, fifth, eighth, and tenth grades of 
compulsory schooling. In my main analysis, I use information on 
mathematics test scores for fifth and eighth grades, which correspond to 
the last grades of primary school and secondary school. 
Best in the class effects could be consistently estimated by OLS re-
gressions of future performance on the best in the class dummy including 
class fixed effects if the assignment of students to classes within a school was 
random. I test whether my data is consistent with random allocation using 
the random allocation test proposed in Guryan, Kroft, & Notowidigdo 
(2009), which explores the correlation between test scores within a class. I 
adapt the test to my setting by studying whether primary school grades are 
correlated within secondary school classes. My results indicate that there is a 
positive and significant correlation between students’ primary-school per-
formances within secondary-school classes in my data. The positive sign of 
the correlation indicates that allocation of students to classes within a school 
is not random and therefore I cannot interpret OLS estimates of future 
performance on best in the class as causal. This justifies the use of my 
instrument. 
Results show that being the best in the class significantly increases 
students’ future performance. The magnitude of the estimated effects is 
high. Being the best in the class in fifth grade increases test scores by 
0.13 standard deviations in eighth grade. Results are robust to the use of 
data from other grades and reading rather than mathematics test scores. 
Estimates cannot be explained by students’ absences or measurement 
error in students’ performance. The effect of being second in the class on 
future performance is also positive but smaller in magnitude. 
1.1. Related literature 
I focus on the best students in the class. The economic literature that 
studies talented students is scarce. Some exceptions are Griffith & Rask 
(2007) and Horstschräer (2012), who study talented children’s school 
choice and Figlio & Lucas (2004), who analyze the impact of high 
grading standards on high ability students. 
This paper relates to the literature on the impact of relative position 
in the school ranking on future educational outcomes.5 Recent papers on 
this argument include Murphy & Weinhardt (2020), Elsner & Isphord-
ing (2017), and Denning, Murphy, & Weinhardt (2018). Murphy & 
Weinhardt (2020) find that being ranked highly during primary school 
has large positive effects on secondary school achievement in the UK, 
with the impact of rank being more important for boys than girls. In their 
sample, most schools have only one class per school cohort and therefore 
their school ranking effects are very similar to class ranking effects. To 
identify ranking effects, they account for test scores in primary school 
using polynomials up to cubic and include school-subject-cohort fixed 
effects in their regressions. Additionally, they estimate separate pa-
rameters for being top and bottom of the school cohort and, consistent 
with this paper, they find discontinuously large estimates for being at 
the extremes of the rank distribution. 
Elsner & Isphording (2017) and Denning et al. (2018) focus on long 
run ranking effects. In the US context, Elsner & Isphording find that if 
two students with the same ability have a different rank in their 
respective cohort, the higher-ranked student is significantly more likely 
to finish high school, attend college, and complete a 4-year college de-
gree. Denning et al. find that a student’s rank in third grade negatively 
impacts grade retention while it positively affects test scores, high 
school graduation, college enrollment, and earnings up to 19 years later 
in the US. In contrast to the two papers mentioned above, I estimate the 
effect of being the best rather than the average effect over all ranking 
positions. Moreover, I focus on the best in the class rather than the best 
in the school. The high magnitude of my best in the class effect 
compared to the effect of school-cohort percentile rank in these papers is 
consistent with the class being a closer reference group for students 
(Dopplinger, 2014). 
The closest papers to mine focus on the class ranking rather than the 
school ranking and exploit a random allocation of students. Cicala, 
Fryer, & Spenkuch (2017) find that, in the context of 61 Kenyan primary 
schools, increasing a student’s class rank by fifty percentiles boosts test 
scores at the end-line by about 0.2 standard deviations. They make use 
of random allocation of students to classes within the same school and 
assume that ability is well accounted for using a quadratic polynomial of 
test scores. Bertoni & Nisticò (2018) exploit a similar experiment 
implemented in the University of Amsterdam where first year students 
in Economics were randomly allocated to tutorial groups. They show 
that students with higher ordinal ability rank within groups have better 
4 Current test scores also include contemporaneous effects of being the best in 
the class and hence my estimation of the effect of being the best in the class on 
future performance is net of those contemporaneous effects. 
5 In this literature review, I focus on the Economic literature which is the 
closest to mine from a methodological point of view. However, the big fish in 
small pond effect has been widely documented in the psychology literature 
starting with the seminal paper by Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Baumert, & 
Köller (1987) while in sociology the first work on social comparisons was 
written by Festinger as early as 1954 (Festinger, 1954). I also focus on future 
educational outcomes but ranking effects have been found on alternative out-
comes. Pagani, Comi, & Origo (2019) analyze the impact of relative rank on 
students’ personality traits. They find that the main channels through which 
rank works are motivation, self-confidence, and learning about own ability and 
hence about expected marginal benefits from studying. Comi, Origo, Pagani, & 
Tonello (2021) find that rank reduces both the probability and frequency of 
perpetrating school violence including verbal, relational, and physical violence. 
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academic outcomes. In their setup, moving from the bottom to the top of 
the within-group ability distribution increases the number of credits 
achieved by about half of a standard deviation. Elsner, Isphording, & 
Zölitz (2018) exploit data with repeated random assignment of students 
to teaching sections and find that a higher rank increases performance 
and the probability of choosing related follow-up courses and majors. 
Differently from these three papers, I focus on the best student rather 
than the average effect of ranking positions and my methodology does 
not require experimental data. 
Given that the best in the class is a very salient position, my paper 
closely relates to the literature on ranking concerns. There is evidence 
suggesting that students care about their achievement rank even in the 
absence of specific rank incentives (Tran & Zeckhauser, 2012, and 
Azmat & Iriberri, 2010). Rank concerns have been studied also in 
various fields outside of education, for example, in the study of 
well-being at work and job satisfaction (Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & 
Qian, 2008, and Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012), of performance in 
sports tournaments (Genakos & Pagliero, 2012), and of labor market 
productivity (Vidal & Nossol, 2011), among others. Tincani (2017) 
points at ranking concerns as one of the mechanisms behind the het-
erogeneity of peer effects. The experimental papers by Gill, Kissová, Lee, 
& Prowse (2019) and Kuziemko, Buell, Reich, & Norton (2014) show 
that individuals react to being at the extremes of the distribution. I 
provide field evidence broadly in line with their experimental findings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I present the data 
and institutional background in Section 2. In Section 3, I describe my 
methodology and in Section 4, I present my results. Section 5 discusses 
several extensions and robustness checks. I conclude in Section 6. 
2. Data and institutional framework 
Education is compulsory in Italy from age 6 to 16. The education 
system is divided into primary school (five years), secondary school 
(three years), and high school (five years). Admission to Italian primary 
schools is based on a point system in which distance from home to 
school, having attended a kindergarten under the same school admin-
istration, and number of siblings (especially if they already attend the 
same school) increase the likelihood of admission. The weight given to 
each of these factors changes across municipalities. I provide more de-
tails about the institutional framework in Appendix A.1. 
I use standardized test score data from the National Institute for the 
Evaluation of the School System (INVALSI) which covers the universe of 
Italian students. Students take standardized tests in the second quarter 
of the second and fifth year of primary school, then three years later in 
the third year of secondary school and finally two years later in the 
second year of high school. INVALSI provides data from academic years 
2009–10 to 2016–17. 
INVALSI tests present two crucial features for this analysis: first, all 
students in Italy take the same test. This allows me to rank individuals in 
the same school and to use standardized scores as a measure of ability. 
Second, individual identifiers are available for the academic years 
2013–14 to 2016–17. I use these identifiers to link individuals in two 
consecutive tests taken three years apart. This is crucial for my identi-
fication strategy because I can study the impact of being the best in the 
class in a given grade on performance three years later: performance in 
eighth grade (secondary school) of the best in the class in fifth grade 
(primary school). 
From second to fifth grade most students remain in the same school, 
with the same classmates and teachers. In contrast, from fifth to eighth 
grades all students change school, teachers and at least part of their 
classmates. For the identification of ranking effects, it is crucial to rely 
on a pre-determined test score. Murphy & Weinhardt (2020) for example 
use primary school (KS2) test scores to rank students in secondary 
school. Elsner & Isphording (2017) rank students on a measure of 
crystallized intelligence which they argue to be fixed before primary 
school. I hence focus on the impact of being best in school in primary 
school (fifth grade) on performance in secondary school (eighth grade). 
The INVALSI data contains test scores from two subjects (reading and 
mathematics) and indicates the number of correct answers. I focus on 
mathematics tests instead of reading because Italian proficiency is likely 
to be affected by migrant status or the use of a regional language at home 
(14% of students declare to speak a language other than Italian at 
home). Still, I check the consistency of my results with those obtained 
using reading test scores in Section 5. I standardize test scores by subject, 
academic year, and grade to have zero mean and unit variance (as in 
Angrist, Battistin, & Vuri, 2017). The data set also includes students’ 
characteristics (among them: gender, migrant status, and whether they 
attended daycare and/or kindergarten) and parental characteristics 
(among them: migrant status, level of education, and occupation). 
I make a series of exclusions to arrive at the sample that I use for my 
analysis. I start from individuals who attended fifth grade in the aca-
demic years 2012–13 to 2013–14 because those are the only cohorts for 
which I have information on test scores in eighth grade. From this 
sample, I select individuals who are in the first eighteen positions of the 
school ranking. I choose that threshold because for those individuals the 
probability of being the best in their class is at least 1%. I show that 
results remain arguably unchanged when I use individuals in the first 
ten, fifteen, and twenty-five positions instead. Finally, I exclude students 
in schools with only one class as my instrument is not exogenous for 
them. 
The resulting data set includes 249,309 students. As part of my 
supplementary analysis, I also estimate the impact of being the best in 
second grade on fifth grade and the impact of being the best in eighth 
grade on tenth grade for which there are 234,502 and 147,520 students, 
respectively.6 The average fifth grade student answers correctly 75% of 
the questions in the mathematics tests. The corresponding percentages 
for second and eighth graders are 76% and 81%, respectively. 
Table 1 presents average key characteristics of students and their 
parents. I describe separately the samples used in the estimations of the 
effect of being the best in the class in second grade on fifth grade per-
formance (first two columns), being the best in the class in fifth grade on 
eighth grade performance (third and fourth columns), and being best in 
the class in eighth grade on tenth grade performance (last two columns). 
I first comment on the samples of fifth to eighth graders which are used 
in my main analysis and then highlight the differences with respect to 
the sample of second to fifth graders and eighth to tenth graders. 
The average test score in the sample of fifth to eighth graders moves 
from 0.8 standard deviations in fifth grade to 0.6 in eighth grade. The 
average student in my sample has a theoretical probability of being the 
best in the class slightly below 0.15. On average students are in schools 
with 3 classes and 18 students per class.7 As my sample is composed of 
students in ranking positions 1 − 18, the average student in my sample 
is number 9 in the school-cohort ranking. There are slightly more males 
than females. Although the incidence of foreign-born is relatively low 
(3%), around 8% of students have an immigrant father and around 10% 
of mothers are immigrants. In the sample of second to fifth graders, 
descriptive statistics are extremely similar to those in the main estima-
tion. Only the reduction in test scores three years later is sharper. In the 
sample of eighth to tenth graders, average test scores are much higher 
(1.14 in eighth grade which go down to 0.77 in tenth grade). Also, the 
theoretical probability of being the best in the class is much higher 
(0.23). The latter is a consequence of the larger number of classes in the 
6 Education is compulsory up to age 16. Thus, some non-randomly selected 
students drop out by tenth grade. This attrition could bias my estimation of the 
impact of best in the class in eighth grade on performance in tenth grade. I 
nevertheless show these results in Section 5. They are consistent with those 
obtained when using students in compulsory education.  
7 There are 62% of students in schools with two classes, 21% in schools with 
three classes, 11% with four classes, 5% with five classes, and the remaining 1% 
in schools with six or more classes. 
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average school (4). Demographic characteristics are comparable across 
the three samples. 
Table 7 in Appendix A.2 provides further information for these 
groups; it describes daycare and kindergarten attendance and the edu-
cation and labor market status of parents. The proportion of students 
who attended daycare was 34% among fifth graders. As much as 86% of 
students attended kindergarten. Regarding the education level of par-
ents, 43% of mothers have a high-school degree. The proportion of 
university graduated mothers is 21%. Fathers are slightly less educated: 
39% of them have a high-school degree and around 18% have a uni-
versity degree. The proportion of homemakers among mothers is rela-
tively high (33%). Although the proportions of white collar workers are 
the same for mothers and fathers (43 − 44%), the proportions of self- 
employed and blue collar workers are low for mothers (9% and 11% 
in each category). These proportions are much more relevant for fathers 
(one fourth of fathers are self-employed and another fourth are blue 
collar). These characteristics are in line with those observed for the 
sample of second to fifth and the sample of eighth to tenth graders except 
for the proportion of students who attended daycare which decreases 
with the grade (moves from 39% to 34% and 27%) and for the pro-
portion of students who attended kindergarten which is higher (89%) for 
children in the highest grades. 
3. Methodology 
My first objective is to address whether students are assigned to 
secondary school classes depending on their performance in primary 
school.8 If allocation was completely random, I could estimate the 
impact of best in the class using an OLS regression of future test scores on 
best in the class controlling for class dummies. Otherwise, my instru-
ment becomes useful to estimate the impact of best in the class on future 
performance. The random allocation test also speaks about the proper-
ties of my IV estimation. If class assignment is close to a random allo-
cation, the correlation of best in the class with the exogenous probability 
of being the best in the class is high and hence my instrument is strong. 
I explore the randomness of class assignment by regressing the in-
dividuals’ test scores in primary school on the average test scores ob-
tained in primary school by their secondary school classmates. In the 
context of this regression, the coefficient associated with the average test 
scores is negatively biased even when classes are formed randomly. The 
reason is that individuals cannot be their own peers, i.e., the urn from 
which the classmates of an individual are drawn does not include the 
individual. Thus, even under random assignment, students at risk to be 
classmates with high-test score individuals have on average lower test 
scores than students at risk to be classmates with low-test score in-
dividuals. Guryan et al. (2009) propose a correction to account for this 
negative bias by including the average test score of all potential class 
members excluding the student as a control in the regression. The 
resulting equation is as follows:  
where TS is the mathematics test score at the individual level while 
Mean TS in class and Mean TS in school are the average test scores of all 
students excluding individual i in the class and school-cohort, respec-
tively. Subindexes t and t + 3 refer to primary and secondary school, 
respectively. Under random assignment, γ1 equals zero. 
If the coefficients arising from the estimation of Eq.  (1) are equal to 
their theoretical values under random assignment, I can estimate the 
impact of being the best in the class on future outcomes using OLS. 
Otherwise, I need to use an IV. In this latter case, if the coefficient es-
timates are close to their theoretical values, class assignment is close to 
random, and as a consequence, my instrument is strong. 
After this preliminary check, I move to the estimation of the impact 
of being the best in the class on future performance. I regress the test 
score in secondary school on a dummy for being the best in the class in 
primary school as follows: 
TSi,t+3 = α0 + α1Besti,t + α2Xi,t + α3D(TS)i,t + α4D(Class)t + εi,t (2)  
where Best is an indicator of best student in the class. X are the indi-
vidual characteristics described in tables 1 and 7, D(TS) are dummies for 
test scores (rounded up to the first digit), and D(Class) are class fixed- 
effects.9 
Including students’ test scores at time t accounts for students’ ability. 
Contemporaneous test scores also control for contemporaneous effects 
of being the best in the class on test scores. Cicala et al. (2017) account 
for ability including the baseline score and its square, Murphy & 
Weinhardt (2020) include polynomials up to the cubic term, while Els-
ner & Isphording (2017) include a fourth order polynomial of test scores 
in their regressions. In my main analysis, I use the most flexible speci-
fication by first rounding the test score data up to the first digit and then 
including (rounded) test score fixed effects in my regressions. Finally, 
the vector of class fixed effects is necessary to account for average se-
lection into classes, peer effects, teacher quality, and any other average 
unobservable characteristic which is common to all students in a class. 
In the context of the previous regression, some concerns on the 
exogeneity of best in the class may arise. Excellent students may influ-
ence each other such that the presence of another excellent student in 
the class makes it less likely to be the best in the class and increases 
future test scores, generating a negative bias. Class fixed effects do not 
eliminate this bias as excellent students may not affect all classmates 
equally. For this reason, I propose an instrument that provides consistent 
estimates even if class allocation is not random. The instrument is also 
useful to attenuate measurement error or in case specific types of stu-
dents move classes. It also helps if expectations about future test scores 
influence the effort students make to become the best in the class. 
TSi,t = γ0 + γ1Mean TSt in class− i,t+3 + γ2Mean TSt in school− i,t+3 + γ3School-cohorti,t+3 + …
… + γ4Class-sizei,t+3 + γ5D(t + 3) + vi,t
(1)   
8 I test for randomness of class assignment with respect to performance in 
primary school which is different from innate ability or pre-school performance. 
For instance, principals may have initially assigned students randomly with 
respect to their innate ability or pre-school performance but peer effects, 
teacher traits, and school characteristics may generate a non random allocation 
in primary school. Alternatively, principals may have sorted students across 
classes according to their ability but later changes in performance may result in 
a more random allocation. 
9 The inclusion of contemporaneous test scores as controls refers to the proxy 
control version of the bad control problem (pages 66–68 of Angrist & Pischke, 
2009). Therefore, under the assumption that the slope coefficient from a 
regression of academic ability on best in the class is positive, my estimates of 
the effect of being best in the class on future performance are lower bounds of 
the true effect. 
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3.1. The instrument 
My instrument is the theoretical probability P of being the best in the 
class under random assignment of students to classes within a school. To 
construct P, I take two variables as given: students’ position in the 
school-cohort ranking and the number of classes in the school-cohort. 
Therefore, P is the theoretical probability that all better students in 
the same school-cohort are allocated to other classes. In practice, this is a 
deterministic function of position in the school-cohort ranking and 
number of classes in the school-cohort such that:  
• If the student is the second in the school-cohort & there are two 
classes in the school, then P = 1/2.  
• If the student is the second in the school-cohort & there are three 
classes in the school, then P = 2/3.  
• If the student is the third in the school-cohort & there are two classes 
in the school, then P = 1/2 ∗ 1/2 = 1/4  
• If the student is the third in the school-cohort & there are three classes 
in the school, then P = 2/3 ∗ 2/3 = 4/9 







where #classes is the number of classes in the school-cohort and CR is 
the position of the student in the school-cohort ranking.10 
Fig. 1 shows the theoretical and empirical probabilities of being the 
best in the class. The empirical probabilities are the proportion of best in 
the class students among those with the same theoretical probability. 
The 45-degree line illustrates the reference case in which theoretical and 
empirical probabilities are the same, i.e., under random assignment. The 
size of the circles reflects that the nature of the instrument makes certain 
values of the theoretical probabilities more common (for example: 0.5, 
0.25, 0.125, and 0.03125). The actual probabilities of being the best in 
the class are similar but typically smaller than the corresponding theo-
retical values under random assignment. This can be explained if in 
some cases, students of similar abilities are assigned to the same class or 
if there are peer effects. 
The instrument is a function of the school-cohort ranking and the 
number of classes in the school. The instrument would be invalid only if 
there was an omitted factor correlated with the specific functional form 
in Equation  (3) after controlling for class fixed effects. 
4. Results 
I first present the results of testing the random assignment of students 
to classes within a school. I then show the naïve OLS estimates of test 
scores on best in the class which constitute a reference for the causal 
estimates. Finally, I describe the results of the set of regressions asso-
ciated with the causal estimate of best in the class on future 
performance. 
Table 2 shows the results of the test for exogeneity of assignment of 
individuals to different groups proposed by Guryan et al. (2009). This 
test incorporates a correction of the negative bias induced by the pres-
ence of the individual herself in the analyzed group. I implement it by 
estimating Equation  (1). The results of this test suggest that there is a 
positive and significant correlation among students’ performance within 
classes. Results are robust to the inclusion of average test score obtained 
in primary school by primary school classmates as an additional control 
in Equation  (1). This positive assortative matching may arise because 
principals assign students of similar ability to the same class. This con-
firms that I need to use my instrument to obtain consistent estimates of 
the effect of being the best in the class on future performance. 
I then move to the estimation of the causal effect of being the best in 
the class. As a reference point, I estimate the OLS regression of test scores 
in secondary school on being the best in the class in primary school 
controlling for a fourth order polynomial of test scores at t, indicators of 
other positions in the class ranking, the individual characteristics 
described in Tables 1 and 7, school-cohort fixed effects, and year in-
dicators (see column 1 of Panel A, Table 3). I first add class fixed effects 
(column 2) and then substitute the fourth order polynomial of test scores 
by test score dummies (column 3) to arrive to the specification in 
Equation  (2). We find that the association between best in the class and 
future test scores is positive and small in all regressions. Controlling for 
class fixed effects reduces the coefficient associated with best in the class 
from 0.14 to 0.05. Substituting the fourth order polynomial in test scores 
by test score fixed effects leaves the coefficient almost unaltered. This 
suggests that unobserved average characteristics of the class may be 
biasing the OLS coefficient upward. 
To address the potential endogeneity of best in the class in the OLS 
regressions above, I use the instrument defined in Section 3.1. The first 
stage estimations displayed in Panel B, Table 3 show that the instrument 
is strong in all three specifications. Therefore, my IV regressions provide 
valid estimates of the causal effect of best in the class for the subpopu-
lation of compliers, i.e., those randomly assigned to classes for whom the 
probability of being the best in the class depends on the exogenous 
probability that better students are assigned to other classes. 
Next, I estimate the impact of the theoretical probability of being the 
best in the class in primary school on test scores in secondary school. I 
use a reduced form specification in which I substitute the dummy for 
being the best in the class by the theoretical probability of being the best 
in the class under random assignment in Equation  (2). The results of 
such exercise are displayed in Panel C, Table 3. The effect of the theo-
retical probability of being the best in the class on future test scores is 
positive, significant and consistent across specifications. The magnitude 
of the estimated causal effect shows that a change in the theoretical 
probability of being the best in the class from zero to one increases test 
scores three years later by 0.14 standard deviations. 
To gain a sense of the magnitude of the impact of being the best in the 
class on future test scores I instrument being the best in the class by the 
theoretical probability of being the best in the class. Results in Panel D, 
Table 3 show that individuals who become the best in the class because 
school mates who are better than them are assigned to a different class 
improve their test scores three years later by 0.13 standard deviations on 
average.11 The higher magnitude of my IV estimates with respect to my 
OLS estimates indicates that, when within-class correlation is present, 
the estimated best in the class effect is smaller because also the perfor-
mances of the best and other students in the class are correlated. Results 
are robust to the use of raw test scores computed as the sum of correct 
10 In computing the theoretical probability of being the best in the class I omit 
that this probability depends on the number of slots in each class. Results 
remain invariant when I use an alternative instrument that takes class size into 
account. I construct this alternative instrument under the condition that all 
classes within a school-cohort are equally sized. Thus, I avoid that the corre-
lation between students’ ability and class size affects my instrument. Such 
correlation is different from zero if, for instance, principals assign poor per-
forming students to small classes. 
11 In Equation  (2), I could have included dummies for all ranking positions 
other than the second one to precisely define the control group (students who 
are second in the class). In the context of that regression, α1 would reflect the 
effect of being best rather than second in the class. However, simultaneously 
instrumenting all class ranking dummies is not possible as the full rank con-
dition of the instrument matrix would fail. Therefore, I exclude all ranking 
positions other than the second one from my regressions and interpret the co-
efficient associated to best in the class as the impact of being best with respect 
to any other ranking position. Results remain arguably unchanged. The reason 
is that compliers in my regressions are mostly students who are best in the class 
if the instrument is high and second in the class if the instrument is low. 
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answers rather than standardized test scores. Removing students with 
test score equal to that of another classmate leaves the estimated effect 
of best in the class arguably unchanged (there are 7% of test score ties in 
the data.). 
5. Robustness checks and extensions 
In this section, I first study the robustness of my main results. In 
particular, I check whether students who are best in the class are com-
parable to those in other positions of the class ranking in terms of pre- 
determined characteristics after controlling for all the variables in 
Equation  (2). Next, I explore whether my results are affected by stu-
dents’ absenteeism. I then study whether my results are driven by 
measurement error in students’ performance. Moreover, I show that my 
results are robust to the inclusion of the standard measure of percentile 
rank used by previous literature (Murphy & Weinhardt, 2020 and Elsner 
& Isphording, 2017) as an additional control in my regressions. Besides, 
I show that results become even stronger when I exclude the best student 
in the school cohort who does not contribute to the identification. 
I also extend my analysis in several ways: I study the impacts of being 
the best in the class in second grade on performance in fifth grade and 
being the best in the class in eighth grade on performance in tenth grade, 

















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Theoretical Probability
Fig. 1. Empirical versus theoretical probabilities of being the best in the class. Notes: Data is from INVALSI test for the years 2012-13 and 2013-14. Each circle 
represents the proportion of best of the class students for each value of the theoretical probability of being the best in the class. The size of the circle is proportional to 
the number of students used to compute the probabilities. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. Grades 2, 5 and 8.   
Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 8 






Test score in t  0.769 0.639 0.778 0.663 1.137 0.623 
Test score in t + τ  0.481 0.840 0.606 0.879 0.771 0.926 
Instrument 0.148 0.265 0.148 0.265 0.232 0.294 
# classes 2.647 1.019 2.65 1.026 4.178 2.339 
# students in 
class 
19.135 3.761 18.458 3.772 19.683 3.926 
Student ranking 
in grade 
9.444 5.184 9.449 5.186 9.247 5.189 
Male 0.531 0.499 0.534 0.499 0.541 0.498 
Immigrant child 0.019 0.138 0.027 0.163 0.031 0.173 
Immigrant father 0.085 0.28 0.079 0.27 0.069 0.253 
Immigrant 
mother 
0.108 0.31 0.099 0.299 0.088 0.284 
Notes: This table presents averages and standard deviations (left and right col-
umn, respectively) for each sample used in the estimations. The number of ob-
servations is 234,502 in grade 2, 249,309 in grade 5 and 147,783 in grade 8. t +τ 
refers to the next grade for which an INVALSI test is available. 
Table 2 
Random assignment test with negative bias correction.   
Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 10 
Mean TSt classt+3  0.216 0.192 0.349  
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Mean TSt gradet+3  –39.868 –60.076 –43.454  
(0.188)∗∗∗ (0.494)∗∗∗ (0.966)∗∗∗
Obs. 645890 818615 356762 
R2  0.839 0.705 0.519 
Notes: Data is from INVALSI test for the years 2012 − 13 and 2013 − 14. The 
dependent variable is the standardized mathematics test score. All regressions 
include school-cohort fixed effects, class size dummies, and year indicators. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. 
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test scores, and I explore the impacts of being second and worst in the 
class on future performance. 
Next, I perform some heterogeneity analysis. In particular, I study 
how the estimated effect changes by gender, by class size, and by school 
quality. I also explore whether the best in the class effect changes when I 
modify my sample to include students at different positions of the 
school-cohort ranking. Finally, I study how the estimated effect changes 
with the distance between the best and the second student in the class. 
5.1. Robustness checks 
My estimation strategy assumes that being best in the class is as if 
randomly assigned in the context of my regressions. If this is the case, 
there should not be any effect of best in the class on pre-determined 
characteristics. Panel A of Table 4 shows the result of using each of 
the predetermined characteristics in tables 1 and 7 as alternative 
dependent variables in Equation  (2). All estimated effects are highly 
insignificant except for the effect of being the best in the class on the 
male dummy which gives a negative significant estimate. I argue that 
this is not a concern since males tend to get higher mathematics grades 
and hence it operates against the positive effect of best in class on future 
performance. Moreover, I control for a male dummy in all regressions. 
In my analysis, the main regressor of interest is a dummy equal to one 
if the student is the best in the class. In practice, the best in the class is 
the student with the highest test score in the class. One potential concern 
is that the variable best in the class is subject to measurement error if the 
Table 3 
Main specification Panel A: Test scores in secondary school on best in the class in 
primary school. OLS.   
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class 0.144 0.05 0.052  
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.234 0.251 0.25 
Panel B: First stage. Best in the class in primary school on theoretical probability  
(1) (2) (3) 
Theoretical probability 0.951 1.037 1.038  
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.483 0.592 0.592 
Panel C: Reduced form. The impact of theoretical probability of being best in the class 
in primary school on test scores in secondary school  
(1) (2) (3) 
Theoretical probability 0.166 0.134 0.139  
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.232 0.251 0.251 
Panel D: The impact of best in the class in primary school on test scores in secondary 
school. IV  
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class 0.175 0.129 0.134  
(0.011)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.234 0.25 0.25 
Notes: Data is from INVALSI test for the years 2012 − 13 and 2013 − 14 
together with INVALSI test scores for years 2015 − 16 and 2016 − 17. All 
regressions include the individual characteristics described in Tables 1 and 7, 
school-cohort fixed effects, and year indicators. Best in the class is instrumented 
using the theoretical probability of being the best in the class. Standard errors 
are clustered at the school level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. 
Table 4 
Robustness Checks Panel A: Effect of Best in the Class on Pre-determined 
Characteristics. IV.   




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Best in class -.038 -.0004 0.007 -.006  
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 249309 









(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Best in class 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.007  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 249309 









(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Best in class 0.006 0.01 -.003 -.001  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.198 0.244 0.013 0.03 
Panel B: Excluding Randomly Selected Students. Average over 100 replications. IV  
(1) (2) (3)  




No Yes Yes  
Test score 
dummies 
No No Yes  
Obs. 249309 249309 249309  
R2  0.244 0.253 0.253  
Panel C: Scores given by the Teacher in the First Quarter. IV  
(1) (2) (3)  




No Yes Yes  
Test score 
dummies 
No No Yes  
Obs. 246029 246029 246029  
R2  0.236 0.252 0.252  
Panel D: Standard Percentile Rank Measure as Control. IV  
(1) (2) (3)  








No Yes Yes  
Test score 
dummies 
No No Yes  
Obs. 249309 249309 249309  
R2  0.237 0.251 0.251  
Panel E: Excluding the Best Student in the School Cohort. IV  
(1) (2) (3)  




No Yes Yes  
Test score 
dummies 
No No Yes  
Obs. 235278 235278 235278  
R2  0.19 0.205 0.204  
Notes: Data is from INVALSI test for the years 2013 − 14 and 2014 − 15 
together with test scores for years 2015 − 16 and 2016 − 17. The dependent 
variable in panels B-E is the mathematics test score in secondary school. All 
regressions include the individual characteristics described in tables 1 and 7, 
school-cohort fixed effects, and year indicators. Best in the class is instrumented 
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actual best student in the class is absent the day of the test or has a ”bad 
day”. To understand the consequences of this source of measurement 
error in terms of coefficient estimates, I randomly select five percent of 
students in my original estimation sample, exclude them from the 
sample, and replicate the main estimation. I repeat this exercise one 
hundred times and present the average of these estimates in Panel B of 
Table 4. They show that the absence of randomly chosen individuals 
from the sample leaves the coefficient unchanged. 
Students’ performance on the INVALSI test may not mirror their 
school performance. INVALSI data contains information on the mathe-
matics score given by the teacher in the first quarter of the academic 
year. This score is a discrete number from one to ten. It is an interme-
diate score which does not appear in the final student record. Hence, it is 
also an imperfect measure as teachers may use it to affect students’ 
effort. However, school scores may still be informative as students are 
likely to find out about the best in their class through performance 
during the academic year rather than through INVALSI tests which are 
given towards the end of the academic year. I use the score obtained in 
the first quarter as an alternative measure of students’ school perfor-
mance. 82% of best in the class students according to INVALSI tests are 
also best in the class according to the score obtained in the first quarter. 
In Panel C of Table 4, I restrict my sample to those students who are best 
in the class according to both scores and results become even stronger. 
I argue that the effect of being best in the class is different from the 
average ranking effect. I provide evidence in this regard by including the 
standard measure of percentile rank used by previous literature (Murphy 
& Weinhardt, 2020 and Elsner & Isphording, 2017) as an additional 
control in my regressions. The coefficient of best in the class remains 
very similar which indicates that the best in the class effect is different 
from average rank effects. Panel D of Table 4 includes the corresponding 
results. 
The best student in the cohort is always the best in the class. As a 
result, these students do not provide useful variation to identify the ef-
fect of being best in the class. I re-run the whole specification without 
the students who are top of their cohort and show the results of this 
exercise in Panel E of Table 4. The estimated coefficient of best in the 
class is even higher. 
5.2. Extensions 
As mentioned above, INVALSI data also allows me to study the 
impact of best in the class in second grade on performance in fifth grade 
(both in primary school) and the impact of best in the class in eighth 
grade (third grade of secondary school) on performance in tenth grade 
(second grade of high-school). The transition from second to fifth grade 
takes place in the same school so it is more difficult to consider the class 
ranking in second grade as pre-determined with respect to fifth grade 
performance. Still, I present the corresponding results in Panel A of 
Table 5. Similarly to the transition from primary to secondary school, 
the transition from eighth to tenth grade implies a change in school, 
from secondary to high school. Unfortunately, the estimation of best in 
the class effects on performance in tenth grade is affected by attrition as 
some students in that grade become sixteen and can therefore legally 
drop out from school. As those students are unlikely to be at top posi-
tions of the school-cohort ranking, I show the results of such estimation 
in Panel B of Table 5. Both sets of results confirm the positive impact of 
being the best in the class on future performance. The estimated effects 
are stronger as compared to those in the main analysis and indicate that 
being the best in the class increases future test scores by 0.15 − 0.16 
standard deviations. 
Throughout my analysis, I focus on mathematics instead of reading 
test scores because the former are less affected by Italian language 
proficiency which varies significantly across Italian regions depending 
on the incidence of regional languages and migration. Still, I replicate 
my analysis using reading test scores to define the ranking of students 
and to measure their performance. Panel C of Table 5 shows the results 
of this exercise which are stronger than those obtained using mathe-
matics test scores. The magnitude of the estimated effects indicates that 
being the best in the class in primary school increases reading test scores 
in secondary school by 0.16 standard deviations. 
Are ranking effects linear? If they are, the impact of being best in the 
class should be equivalent to the impact of being second in the class. I 
estimate the impact of being the second as opposed to lower-ranking 
positions in the class on future performance using the theoretical 
probabilities of being second in the class as an instrument (see Panel D of 












for all school-cohort ranking positions other than the first. For the best 
student in the school-cohort P equals zero. All specifications show that 
being second in the class in primary school has a positive and significant 
effect on performance in secondary school. In terms of magnitude, the 
impacts of being best and second as opposed to lower-ranking positions 
in the class equal 0.16 and 0.13 standard deviations, respectively. 
Therefore, the impact of being best is higher than the impact of being 
using the theoretical probability of being the best in the class. Standard errors 
are clustered at the school level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. 
Table 5 
Extensions Panel A: The impact of best in the class in second grade on test scores 
in fifth grade. IV .   
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class 0.196 0.151 0.15  
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 234502 234502 234502 
R2  0.175 0.197 0.197 
Panel B: The impact of best in the class in secondary school on test scores in high 
school. IV  
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class 0.201 0.15 0.159  
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 147783 147783 147783 
R2  0.215 0.23 0.23 
Panel C: The impact of best in the class in primary school on reading test scores in 
secondary school. IV  
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class 0.187 0.151 0.159  
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249195 249195 249195 
R2  0.204 0.215 0.215 
Panel D: The impact of second in the class in primary school on test scores in secondary 
school. IV  
(1) (2) (3) 
Second in class 0.133 0.125 0.133  
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
Best in class 0.195 0.148 0.155  
(0.011)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.237 0.25 0.25 
Notes: Data is from INVALSI test for the years 2013 − 14 and 2014 − 15 
together with test scores for years 2015 − 16 and 2016 − 17. All regressions 
include the individual characteristics described in tables 1 and 7, school-cohort 
fixed effects, and year indicators. Best in the class is instrumented using the 
theoretical probability of being the best in the class. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the school level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. 
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second in the class by 23%. This constitutes evidence against the line-
arity of ranking effects. My findings are in line with the non-linear re-
lationships found in experiments that emphasize the importance of 
being ranked first or last (Gill et al., 2019 and Kuziemko et al., 2014). 
The methodology employed to estimate the impact of the best of the 
class on future performance can be used to estimate the impact of being 
the worst in the class. In this case, the instrument is based on the 
probability that individuals who are worse than a given student are in 
classes different from him or her. The estimated coefficient is close to 
zero and insignificant and hence, I could not find any effect of being 
worst in the class. Results are available upon request. 
5.3. Heterogeneity 
Similarly to the average ranking effect (Murphy & Weinhardt, 2013), 
the effect of being the best in the class may differ across genders. I 
explore this possibility by interacting the best in the class variable with a 
male dummy. Results, presented in Panel A of Table 6, are consistent 
with Murphy & Weinhardt (2013) in that males are more affected by 
ranking effects. Males who are best in the class increase their future 
performance by 0.05 standard deviations more than females in the first 
position of the class ranking. I also explore whether the estimated pos-
itive effect differs by class size and school quality as measured by the 
average score in the school. I find that the best in the class effect de-
creases with class size and increases with school quality. 
In my main analysis, I restrict my sample to students who are in 
positions from one to eighteen in the school-cohort ranking. Those 
students have probabilities above one percent of being the best in the 
class. Moreover, eighteen is also the average number of students in a 
class. In this section, I explore how my results change when I modify this 
sample selection criterion. Panel B of Table 6 contains the results of 
using three different samples including students who are in ranking 
positions up to ten, fifteen, and twenty-five. As a result of changing the 
sample, the number of observations becomes 139,492, 205,868, and 
340,683, respectively. The resulting estimates show that the estimated 
effect is always positive and significant and it becomes stronger for more 
restrictive sample definitions. This indicates that students at higher 
positions in the school-cohort ranking benefit more from being best in 
the class. This finding is consistent with psychological mechanisms like 
the impostor phenomenon. Students with the impostor phenomenon 
experience intense feelings that their achievements are undeserved and 
worry that they are likely to be exposed as a fraud (Clance, 1985). In my 
setup, students who are more likely to feel as an impostor are those 
students who are best in the class due to luck instead of true talent, i.e., 
those are relatively low positions in the school-cohort ranking. 
The distance between the best and the second student in the class in 
terms of current performance may influence the effect of best in the class 
on future performance. On the one hand, best students who perform 
much better than the second student in their class may have higher self- 
esteem. On the other hand, best students who perform similarly to the 
second student in their class may exert more effort in response to 
competition or enjoy higher-quality peer effects from the second student 
in the class. I explore how the best in the class effect changes with the 
distance between the best and the second student in the class. To this, I 
perform alternative regressions in which I add the interaction of the best 
in the class dummy with a dummy for distance equal to or higher than 
0.221 (the median distance in the sample). I present the results of this 
exercise in Panel C of Table 6. Results show that the best in the class 
effect is higher for best in the class students who are closer to the second 
student in the class. This constitutes evidence in favor of the competition 
and better peer mechanisms. 
6. Discussion 
Being the best student in the class would be beneficial if it makes 
students have more self-confidence, exert effort in line with high ex-
pectations, or receive more attention and better treatment by teachers 
and peers. In contrast, being the best in the class would be detrimental if 
it implies unbearable psychological pressure, if it makes students exert 
lower effort because they do not feel challenged or inspired by a better 
peer, if a better peer would have been helpful when studying or doing 
homework together, or if best in the class students are more likely to be 
bully victims. Hence, the question of whether being the best in the class 
is beneficial or detrimental does not have an obvious theoretical answer. 
Moreover, answering this question empirically is challenging because in 
most cases students are not assigned to classes randomly. Actually, in my 
data, I find evidence of positive assortative matching across classes 
within the same school. In this paper, I design a novel methodology to 
estimate the impact of being the best in the class on future performance. 
My methodology can be applied when experimental data is not 
available. 
I exploit natural exogenous variation in class assignment within 
schools and I find that being the best in the class has enhancing effects on 
future performance. Results are robust to the study of different grades 
and to the use of reading rather than mathematics test scores. Interest-
ingly, the effect of being second in the class is smaller, confirming that 
best in the class is different from other positions in the ranking. The 
estimated positive effect is stronger for males, students in smaller clas-
ses, and those in high-quality schools. It is also stronger for students in 
higher positions of the school-cohort ranking and for students who 
perform similarly to their best peer. My findings have implications in 
terms of the non-linearity of ranking effects at the extremes of the ability 
distribution and inform education policy: Excellent students may benefit 
Table 6 
Heterogeneity Panel A: Heterogeneity by gender, class size, and school quality. 
IV.   
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class by male 0.054    
(0.012)∗∗∗
Best in class by class size  –0.003    
(0.001)∗
Best in class by school quality   0.215    
(0.013)∗∗∗
Best in class 0.103 0.184 0.152  
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.25 0.25 0.249 
Panel B: Different samples. IV  
up to 10th up to 15th up to 25th  
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class 0.217 0.162 0.102  
(0.011)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
Obs. 139492 205868 340683 
R2  0.166 0.219 0.313 
Panel C: High distance from best to second student in the class. IV  
(1) (2) (3) 
Best in class by high distance –0.055 –0.141 –0.143  
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Best in class 0.221 0.18 0.186  
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Class fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Test score dummies No No Yes 
Obs. 249309 249309 249309 
R2  0.234 0.25 0.25 
Notes: Data is from INVALSI test for the years 2013 − 14 and 2014 − 15 
together with test scores for years 2015 − 16 and 2016 − 17. The dependent 
variable is the mathematics test score in secondary school. All regressions 
include the individual characteristics described in tables 1 and 7, school-cohort 
fixed effects, and year indicators. Best in the class is instrumented using the 
theoretical probability of being the best in the class. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the school level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. 
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from accommodation in a regular classroom where they are the best in 
the class rather than grouping with students of similar abilities. Thus, 
my results constitute an additional argument in favor of forming classes 
with heterogenous ability levels. 
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Appendix A 
A1. Institutional background 
The Italian education system is divided into primary school (grades 1 
to 5), secondary school (grades 6 to 8) and high school (grades 9 to 13). 
Education is compulsory between the age of six (grade 1) and sixteen 
(grade 10). After secondary school, students start high school and follow 
one of three tracks (vocational school, technical school, lyceum). The 
school year starts mid-September and finishes mid-June. Education is 
compulsory from September of the year the student becomes 6 up to age 
16 which implies that students who have not repeated any grade can 
drop out from school in grade 10 (second grade of high school). Students 
who repeat grades can drop out in lower grades as soon as they become 
16. 
The randomness of class assignment is at the heart of my estimation. 
In Italian primary schools, classes are formed in first grade when there is 
no comparable information on student performance (most students 
cannot read or write yet and in the vast majority of cases there are no 
interviews or psychological assessments) and the composition of classes 
is typically kept fixed up to fifth grade. New classes are formed in sixth 
grade when students move from primary to secondary school and their 
composition is kept fixed up to eighth grade. Again, principals of the 
new school typically do not have access to comparable performance 
information when they form classes. Even if they had, there are no 
official indications or directives on whether homogenous or 
heterogeneous classes should be formed. However, principals may use 
other observable characteristics (students’ home address, parental ed-
ucation, previous school, number of siblings, special needs, etc.) to 
proxy for student future performance and use this information to form 
classes. Principals may also respond to parental requests to group their 
children with their friends. Moreover, by the time that the ranking is 
measured students have already spent time in school, sharing teachers 
with their classmates. Hence, peer interaction, teacher traits, and school 
characteristics may generate a positive correlation of students’ test 
scores within a class even if the class composition was random with 
respect to the pre-school ranking. 
A2. Other student characteristics 
Table 7 describes daycare and kindergarten attendance, parental 
education and parental labor market status of students included in the 
regressions of being the best in the class in second grade on fifth grade 
performance, being the best in fifth grade on eighth grade, and being the 
best in eighth grade on tenth grade. 
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